Abstract

The literature on differential privacy almost invariably assumes that the data to be analyzed are fully observed. In most practical applications this is an unrealistic assumption. A popular strategy to address this problem is imputation, in which missing values are replaced by estimated values given the observed data. In this paper we evaluate various approaches to answering queries on an imputed dataset in a differentially private manner, as well as discuss trade-offs as to where along the pipeline privacy is considered. We show that if imputation is done without consideration to privacy, the sensitivity of certain queries can increase linearly with the number of incomplete records. On the other hand, for a general class of imputation strategies, these worst case scenarios can be greatly reduced by ensuring privacy already during the imputation stage. We use a simulated dataset to demonstrate these results across a number of imputation schemes (both private and non-private) and examine their impact on the utility of a private query on the data.

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Audit summary

Audited against arXiv v2

Not a correctness certificate. A green “no issues found” result may include yellow suspected typos or minor formal issues that do not affect substantive soundness. It means this audit found no unresolved substantive error under the stated criteria; it does not replace expert scrutiny or formal verification.

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Detailed mathematical audit

Generated September 26, 2026
01Statements2 reported findingsNo statement issues found

The group-privacy bound, the linear sensitivity amplification example, and the two-stage privacy guarantee are correct under the paper's stated recordwise-imputation assumptions.

Propositions 3.1–3.2No issue found

Non-private imputation can amplify privacy loss and sensitivity linearly

Pages 2–3 · Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 · arXiv:2206.15063v2

Neighboring incomplete datasets can produce completed datasets at Hamming distance at most nmis+1n_{\mathrm{mis}}+1. Group privacy therefore gives the displayed exponential privacy-loss bound, and telescoping along a record-by-record chain gives sensitivity at most (nmis+1)Δ(q)(n_{\mathrm{mis}}+1)\Delta(q). The order is attainable: with an intercept-only regression trained on a single complete response and n−1n-1 missing responses, changing that training response from aa to bb changes all nn completed responses, so the mean changes by b−a=nΔ(q)b-a=n\Delta(q).

Full paper, version 2 ↗
Theorem 3.3No issue found

Private parameter fitting composes with private analysis

Pages 3–4 · Theorem 3.3 · arXiv:2206.15063v2

For each fixed privately estimated parameter vector θ^\hat{\theta}, the recordwise imputation kernel maps neighboring original datasets to completed datasets that can be coupled to differ only in the changed record. The subsequent mechanism is therefore ϵ2\epsilon_2-differentially private conditional on the first output. Adaptive sequential composition with the ϵ1\epsilon_1-private fit yields the claimed (ϵ1+ϵ2)(\epsilon_1+\epsilon_2) guarantee.

02Proofs4 reported findingsNo proof issues found

The privacy and sensitivity arguments are complete after three uniquely determined notation and display corrections in Proposition 3.2.

Proposition 3.2Suspected typo

The global-sensitivity display mixes variable names

Page 2 · definition of Δ(q)\Delta(q) before Proposition 3.2 · arXiv:2206.15063v2

The outer maximum introduces YY, while its neighbor condition uses DD and the objective uses undefined Y′Y'. Use one pair consistently, for example D,D′D,D', and write ∣q(D)−q(D′)∣|q(D)-q(D')|. The surrounding definition and the proof determine this correction uniquely.

Proposition 3.2 proofSuspected minor formal issue

The Hamming chain must be consecutive and may be shorter

Pages 2–3 · proof of the second inequality in Proposition 3.2 · arXiv:2206.15063v2

Replace the sentence saying that every DjD_j differs from the first dataset by one change with: consecutive datasets Dj,Dj+1D_j,D_{j+1} differ in one record, and the chain has at most nmis+1n_{\mathrm{mis}}+1 steps. Telescoping over that chain gives exactly the printed bound, so no downstream conclusion changes.

Proposition 3.2 tightness exampleSuspected incorrect as written · an apparently sound repair

The displayed example contains a false final equality

Page 3 · paragraph after the proof of Proposition 3.2 · arXiv:2206.15063v2

The paper computes (a+(n−1)b)/n−a=(n−1)(b−a)/n(a+(n-1)b)/n-a=(n-1)(b-a)/n and then identifies this with (nmis+1)Δ(q)(n_{\mathrm{mis}}+1)\Delta(q), but the stated setup does not make that final equality true. The intended tight example is immediate: train an intercept-only imputation on one observed response, with the other n−1n-1 responses missing. Changing the observed response from aa to bb changes every completed response, so the mean changes by b−a=nΔ(q)=(nmis+1)Δ(q)b-a=n\Delta(q)=(n_{\mathrm{mis}}+1)\Delta(q). Thus the upper bound is genuinely sharp, but the printed display does not prove it without this correction.

Theorem 3.3 proofSuspected minor formal issue

Adaptive composition needs an explicit recordwise coupling assumption

Pages 3–4 · proof of Theorem 3.3 · arXiv:2206.15063v2

Adaptive composition gives the stated result if, conditional on the fitted parameter, unchanged records can be imputed identically and only the changed record can differ. This follows for deterministic recordwise imputation or for independent local randomness. The displayed marginal condition Dimp(i)∼m(Dobs(i),θ^)D_{\mathrm{imp}}^{(i)}\sim m(D_{\mathrm{obs}}^{(i)},\widehat\theta) does not by itself specify the joint coupling: correlated imputations can have the same recordwise marginals while changing several completed records. The theorem should make the intended local-kernel or conditional-independence assumption explicit; under that reading, the cited adaptive sequential composition applies exactly as claimed.

03Novelty0 reported findingsNo novelty concerns found

No non-novelty findings.

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Paper
arXiv:2206.15063v2
Authors listed
Soumojit Das, Jorg Drechsler, Keith Merrill, Shawn Merrill
Audit date
September 26, 2026
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